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Special Feature
Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty:
A Guide to State Legislative Issues
*James W. Ellis
The interest in State Legislatures in the topic of mental
retardation and the death penalty has obviously heightened
with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia.'
The purpose of this document is to provide legislators and
advocates with guidance in implementing the Atkins decision,
so that each State's death penalty legislation is in full
compliance with constitutional requirements.
In formulating these recommendations, principal attention
is focused, of course, on the Atkins decision itself. But there
are three other major considerations worthy of careful
consideration. First, it is worth considering the experience of
States that have already implemented legislation in this area.
Several of the States have had statutes in effect for more than
a decade, and their experience merits attention, particularly on
questions that affect ease of implementation in the criminal
justice system. Second, the developments in the field of mental
retardation, particularly on questions of definition and clinical
evaluation, have been canvassed and incorporated. Finally,
attention has been paid to other decisions by the Supreme
Court that have been issued since the earlier State statutes
were enacted, most prominently Cooper v. Oklahoma2 and
Ring v. Arizona3on the issues of burdens of persuasion and
the role ofjuries.
These decisions create constitutional questions in this area,
even in some of the States that already had statutes enacted
prior to Atkins. Some of these questions have answers that
are quite clear. Others are issues for which the ultimate judicial
resolution is more doubtful. This Legislative Guide attempts
to analyze these different issues, and where there is room for
doubt, to offer alternative legislative approaches. It is
anticipated that legislators will want to address these questions
both from the perspective of fidelity to constitutional principles
and from concern to avoid unnecessarily imperiling judgments
in subsequent litigation where issues can be anticipated and
resolved in advance.

I. The Supreme Court's Decision in Atkins
In Atkins, the Supreme Court held that the execution of any
individual with mental retardation violated the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
But the Court had begun its consideration of mental retardation

retardation, the form of that evidence was an inadequate basis
for a constitutional prohibition. The Court stated:
The public sentiment expressed in these and other polls
and resolutions may ultimately find expression in
legislation, which is an objective indicator of contemporary
values upon which we can rely. But at present, there is
insufficient evidence of a national consensus against
executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital
offenses for us to conclude that it is categorically prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment.'
At the time that Penry was before the Court, two States and
the Congress had enacted laws prohibiting the execution of
people with mental retardation. In the next dozen years, 16
more States enacted such statutes. Following those
enactments, the Court agreed to reconsider the issue in Atkins.6
The Court in Atkins began by noting that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits "excessive" punishments, as well as
those that are cruel and unusual.7 It also observed that the
issue of whether a punishment was excessive could be
illuminated by the way in which State Legislatures had
addressed it. But the ultimate judgment of assessing a
punishment, as well as the nation's attitudes toward it, rests
with the Court itself. "Thus, in cases involving a consensus,
our own judgment is brought to bear by asking whether there
is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry
and its legislators." 8
The Court then surveyed the evidence from the State
Legislatures, including the number of enactments in the years
since Penry,the margins by which the laws passed, legislative
activity in States that had not yet completed action on the
issue, and the report of the Governor of Illinois' recent
commission on the death penalty.'
The Atkins opinion turned next to the public policy
justifications offered in support of capital punishment, and
the extent to which they applied to individuals with mental
retardation. The Court concluded that the execution of persons
with mental retardation would not "measurably contribute[]"
to either deterrence or retribution in the criminal justice
system."l Although the principal focus in the Court's opinion
(as in the State Legislatures) was on the culpability of
defendants who had mental retardation, the Court also noted
concerns about both factual innocence and the
appropriateness of the death penalty. "Mentally retarded
defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful
execution.""
The opinion of the Court concluded:

and the death penalty 13 years earlier in Penry v. Lynaugh.4 In

that case, a majority of the Justices held that although there
was evidence-particularly in the form of public opinion
surveys and resolutions by professional organizations-of a
national consensus against executing anyone with mental
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Our independent evaluation of the issue reveals no reason
to disagree with the judgment of the legislatures that have
recently addressed the matter and concluded that death is
not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.
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We are not persuaded that the execution of mentally
retarded criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or
the retributive purpose of the death penalty. Construing
and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our
evolving standards of decency, we therefore conclude that
such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution
places a substantive restriction on the State's power to
take the life of a mentally retarded offender. 2
II. Substantive Protection for Defendants
with Mental Retardation

The Scope of the ConstitutionalProtection
Atkins makes clear that its holding extends to all defendants
who "fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about
whom there is a national consensus."' 7 This means that while
States are free to adopt variations in the wording of the
definition, they cannot adopt a definition that encompasses
a smaller group of defendants, nor fail to protect any
individuals who have mental retardation under the definition
embodied in the national consensus.
The Definitions of Professional Organizations

The inapplicability of the death penalty to people with
mental retardation was resolved by Atkins. Nevertheless, the
issue should be addressed by State legislation. One reason
for a declaration that such executions violate State law is to
make clear that they are unacceptable, regardless of the
circumstances of timing.
Several of the States that had enacted statutes prior to Atkins
included a provision that the law would only apply to
prosecutions subsequent to the law's effective date. 3 Other
State laws were silent on the subject.' 4 North Carolina's statute
explicitly applied to both prospective cases and those that
might be challenged by individuals already under a death
sentence, and provided separate procedures for the
retrospective cases. I5 North Carolina's approach of addressing
both prospective and retrospective cases has much to
commend it. It will avoid, or at least reduce, extensive litigation
about the procedures to be employed in both classes of cases.
In addition to whatever procedures the State chooses to
adopt for both retrospective and prospective cases, the
Legislature can assure clarity by including a simple provision
that prohibits the execution of any individual with mental
retardation. Language similar to that of the Federal statute 6
will accomplish this substantive protection. (Later sections
of the Guide will address the procedural issues).
Recommendation:
All States that have capital punishment should pass
legislation that protects people with mental retardationfrom
the death penalty.
Recommended Statutory Language:
No person with mental retardationis eligible for the death
penalty.
Ill. Definition of Mental Retardation
There is a broad consensus within the field of mental
retardation as to the scope of the definition that is reflected
both in the legislation in States passed prior to the Atkins
decision and in the Court's opinion itself. Nevertheless, there
are minor variations in wording that legislators will want to
consider.
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The American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR)
is the principal professional organization in the field, and has
propounded (and refined) the definition of mental retardation
for many decades. There are three versions of the AAMR
definition worthy of consideration in legislating on this topic.
First is the definition propounded by AAMR (then identified
as the American Association on Mental Deficiency) in 1983. It
forms the basis of the definitions adopted by most of the State
Legislatures that acted on this topic between the Penry
decision in 1989 and the Atkins decision in 2002. This definition
states:
Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with
deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the
developmental period. 8
Second is the AAMR's reformulation of the definition in
1992. It was built on the same clinical and conceptual
framework, but refined the component of adaptive behavior.
This definition is the one cited by the Supreme Court in
Atkins, 9 and was adopted by a few State Legislatures in the
1990s. It provides:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in
present functioning. It is characterized by significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently
with related limitations in two or more of the following
applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care,
home living, social skills, community use, self-direction,
health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work.
Mental retardation manifests before age 18.20
Third is the AAMR's further refinement of the definition in
2002. The change from the 1992 version was, once again,
modest, and again focused primarily on refining the description
of the adaptive skills component. It states:
Mental retardation is a disability characterized by
significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and
in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social,
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and practical adaptive skills. This disability originates
before age 18.21
The common elements of the three versions of the AAMR
definition address the three components of the concept of
mental retardation: (1) substantial intellectual impairment; (2)
impact of that impairment on the individual's everyday life;
and (3) appearance of the disability at birth or during the
person's childhood. Unless an individual meets all three
requirements, he or she does not fall within the definition of
mental retardation. The variations found in the three
formulations of the AAMR definition differ only in the wording
of how they describe the second component-the impact on
the individual's life. But it is important to emphasize that the
various formulations describethe same group of individuals,
and therefore do not differ in scope in any significant way.
The choice for legislators in selecting one version over
another involves setting the terms under which (1) clinicians
will conduct evaluations of defendants, (2) counsel for the
defense and the prosecution will discuss and negotiate
prospective cases, and (3) when the cases are not resolved by
pleas, the courts will resolve questions concerning a
defendant's eligibility for the death penalty.
Clinical Components of Mental Retardation
It may prove helpful to discuss briefly the three components
common to all clinical definitions. Limited intellectual
functioning is the pivotal component of any individual's
diagnosis. The definition requires that an individual have an
impairment in general intellectual functioning that places him
or her in the lowest category of the general population. As
measured by standard psychometric instruments-IQ
tests--this requires an individual's measured intelligence to
be two standard deviations below the statistical mean. That,
in turn, indicates that he or she scores in approximately the
bottom 22 percent of the population.
However, IQ scores alone cannot precisely identify the upper
boundary of mental retardation. Generally, mental retardation
encompasses everyone with a score of 70 or below.
Additionally, it includes some individuals with scores in the
low 70s (and even mid-70s), depending on the nature of the
testing information. 22 As much as the criminal justice system
might prefer to have a hard-and-fast limitation measurable by
a single IQ score, it is simply impossible to exclude
consideration of other factors about the testing performed on
the individual, or to ignore the need for clinical judgment by
experienced diagnosticians.23
As a result, statutes that specify a particular IQ score in
their definitions of mental retardation will prove difficult to
administer. The absence of such a score has not produced
difficulties in the States whose statutory definitions are more
general, such as those that follow a version of the AAMR
definition.
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The adaptive behavior component requires that the
intellectual impairment have produced real-world disabling
effects on the individual's life. Its purpose is to ensure that
the individual is not merely a poor test-taker, but rather is a
truly disabled individual.24 Most of the existing State
legislation on this topic uses a definition borrowed from the
1983 AAMR definition, and thus describes, in general terms,
"concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior."' A few of the
more recent State enactments have chosen as their model the
1992 AAMR definition, which described this element in terms
of "related limitations in adaptive skill areas" and then provided
a list of such areas, with the requirement that the individual
face limitations in two of these areas. 26 The purpose of
conceptualizing the behavioral prong of the definition around
"limitations in adaptive skill areas" was to focus the attention
of diagnosticians more directly on an individual's need for
services and supports. 27 While this is important to clinicians
working in the service delivery system, it obviously is less
significant for evaluations performed for criminal cases
potentially involving capital punishment.
The formulation in the 2002 AAMR definition appears to be
somewhat better suited for forensic evaluations in death
penalty cases. That version's requirement that the individual
manifest "a disability characterized by significant limitations
both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive
skills"28 addresses the principal concerns of the criminal justice
system. It requires that the intellectual impairment be
manifested in real-world disability in the individual's life, but
at the same time focuses on broad categories of adaptive
impairment, instead of the service-related skill areas of the
1992 version. 29 As a result, the 2002 version is recommended
to legislators.3"
Age of onset is the requirement in many defimitions of mental
retardation that the disability have manifested during the
developmental period. Most States have identified this as
age 18.31 The purpose of this third component of the definition
is to distinguish mental retardation from those forms of brain
damage that may occur later in life. Such later-developing
mental impairment could result from causes such as traumatic
head injury, dementia caused by disease,3 2 or similar
conditions. This distinction is considerably more relevant to
clinicians designing habilitation plans and systems of supports
for an individual than it is to the criminal justice system, since
later-occurring disabilities, assuming that the disability
developed during adulthood but prior to the commission of
the offense, would involve comparable reduction in culpability
for any criminal act.33
The final consideration regarding age of onset, although it
serves no independent purpose regarding a defendant's
culpability, is to ensures that defendants may not feign mental
retardation once charged with a capital offense. The issue of
malingering, which has received considerable attention in the
clinical literature regarding mental illness,'4 has not proven to
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be a practical problem in the assessment of individuals who
may have mental retardation. But any concerns that an
individual could somehow manage to feign cognitive
impairment, undetected by clinical evaluators, should be
dispelled by the fact that such deception would have had to
begin during the individual's childhood. There are no reports
in the clinical literature indicating that this is a practical problem
in the assessment of individuals who are thought to have
mental retardation.
Recommendation:
States should consider adopting the 2002 AAMR definition
of mental retardation.
Recommended Statutory Language:
For purposes of this statute, "Mental Retardation" is
defined as a disability characterized by significant limitations
both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills.
Mental Retardation originates before age 18.
IV. Clinical Evaluations
Although no specific statutory language is recommended
here, the quality of clinical evaluations of a defendant's
intellectual functioning will be crucial to the successful
implementation of Atkins. Although these issues do not appear
to require legislative enactment at this time, there are a couple
of issues that legislators and other policy planners should
keep in mind.
First, Atkins implementation will clearly involve compliance
with Supreme Court case law concerning the role of defense
counsel and access to the assistance of clinical experts. The
lead case on this subject is Ake v. Oklahoma.35 In that case,
the Court held that in order to assure "meaningful access to
justice,"36 an indigent capital defendant whose mental
condition was at issue was entitled to the assistance of "a
competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate
preparation, and
examination and assist in 3evaluation,
7
presentation of the defense.
In the context of Atkins implementation, the need for
professional clinical assistance to defense counsel is even
clearer. But unlike Ake, which involved the insanity defense,
the clinical assistance required will not always (or even very
frequently) be from a psychiatrist. Although some
psychiatrists have experience in assessing people with mental
retardation, most do not.38 Defense counsel, in the first
instance, and ultimately the court, will need an experienced
and trained clinician whose expertise is the field of mental
retardation.
The evaluator (or in some cases, evaluation team) must not
only be skilled in the administration and interpretation of
psychometric (IQ) tests,39 but also in the assessment of
adaptive behavior and the impact of intellectual impairment in
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the individual's life.' A competent professional assessment
will involve more than simply ascertaining an IQ score.4' It
also requires the exercise of experienced clinical judgment in
the field of mental retardation.12 The expertise of skilled mental
disability professionals is crucial to implementing Atkins'
protections and achieving the goals of the criminal justice
system in these cases.43
A final note on the clinical evaluation of these cases may be
in order. Determination of which defendants have mental
retardation cannot be accomplished by casual examination or
impressionistic observations." In Ake, the Court observed
that the assistance of mental health clinicians is essential in
insanity defense cases in order to identify and properly
interpret the "elusive and often deceptive" symptoms of
mental illness. 5 While the Supreme Court has noted, in
another context, some of the differences between mental illness
and mental retardation,46 careful professional evaluations of
mental retardation are just as crucial. Although the courts are
47
generally careful about the evaluation of expert testimony,
particular care must obviously be taken in cases where a
constitutional right is involved, and where the stakes are
literally life and death.
V. Adjudication of New Cases
With the possible exception of defining mental retardation,
the procedure for the adjudication of new cases has received
the greatest attention among State legislators. Within the
context of constitutional protections, there are policy
considerations that will affect the fair treatment of defendant's
claims, the efficient operation of the criminal justice system,
and judicial economy.
When the Mental Retardation Issue Should Be Addressed
Most of the States that have enacted legislation have
chosen to have the issue addressed, in the first instance, in
pretrial proceedings. This makes sense for a number of
reasons. Most importantly, if the defendant has mental
retardation, and therefore is ineligible for the death penalty,
pretrial resolution of the issue saves the State the cost of an
unnecessary capital trial.48 It is universally recognized that
capital trials are vastly more expensive to conduct than
49
noncapital trials.
Moreover, States already have established rules and
timetables for the resolution of pretrial issues in capital cases.
The issue of a defendant's mental retardation can be
accommodated into that schedule. The statute may require
defendant to give notice to the court and to the prosecution
of the intention to raise the issue of mental retardation as a bar
to capital punishment. The time limits on the filing of such a
notice will require some attention, and is a subject on which
legislators may appropriately wish to consult both prosecutors
and defense counsel in their State as to the practical
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considerations involved.
Two general concerns may influence the setting of this
deadline. The deadline should be sufficiently in advance of
the date for the hearing on the issue to permit both sides, and
particularly the prosecution, to investigate the claim. But the
deadline must be late enough in the pretrial period to permit
the defense to investigate and determine whether the client
may actually have mental retardation. Requiring the defense
to submit notification at a premature date may, paradoxically,
produce a greater number of claims by defense lawyers who
have not yet had a full opportunity to investigate the
possibility, but who feel the need to preserve the option of
filing such a notice if the investigation bears out the fact of
the client's mental disability.5 0
Who Should Decide the Issue in PretrialProceedings
Most of the States that have legislated on this topic have
chosen to have the pretrial determination of the defense's
claim concerning mental retardation made by a judge, rather
than a jury. Having this issue addressed in a bench hearing
has worked well in several States that have adopted this
approach. Presenting the arguments on this issue to a judge
is likely to result in a hearing that is less elaborate and less
costly than doing so before a jury."
Consequence of the Judge's Ruling on the Mental
Retardation Issue
If the judge finds that the particular defendant has mental
retardation, the case should be denominated as non-capital,
and in a subsequent trial, the defendant should be eligible for
whatever penalty has been designated by the Legislature for
the offense with which he is charged, except for the penalty of
death.
If the judge finds that the defendant does not have mental
retardation, the case may proceed as a capital trial. As several
States have recognized, a pretrial ruling on ineligibility for the
death penalty because of mental retardation that is adverse to
the defense does not preclude raising mental disability in the
subsequent trial. 52 Therefore it is crucial, in order to avoid
contaminating and undercutting issues properly before the
trial jury (including the question of mitigation if the case
proceeds to a penalty phase), to prevent any reference to the
pretrial proceedings to the jury.
Burden of Producing Evidence
Clearly, the burden of raising the issue of mental retardation
and initially bringing forth some evidence supportive of the
contention can and should be placed on the defendant. 3 If
the defense fails to raise the issue, the prosecution should not
be required to demonstrate that a defendant did not have
mental retardation.
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Burden of Persuasion
This is among the most intricate and perplexing
constitutional issues involved in this legislation. All 18 States
that had enacted legislation prior to Atkins had placed the
burden of persuasion on the defense. Most of the States
merely required the defense to demonstrate mental retardation
by a "preponderance of the evidence,"' but a few placed the
burden at "clear and convincing evidence,"55 and one State
required the defense to demonstrate mental retardation
"beyond a reasonable doubt."56
But those statutes were enacted before the Atkins decision,
which has changed the constitutional calculus on the issue.
Although the States have considerable latitude in allocating
the burden of persuasion on affirmative defenses that are
discretionary options governed only by State law,57 the issue
is different if the claimed right is derived from the Constitution
itself. In Cooper v. Oklahoma,58 a unanimous Supreme Court
held that it violated Due Process for a State to assign the
burden of persuasion to the defendant on the issue of
competence to stand trial at a level of "clear and convincing
evidence."
After Atkins, it is now clear that defendants with mental
retardation have constitutional protection from being
sentenced to death. The States' ability to restrict that Eighth
Amendment right by placing a heavy burden of persuasion
on the defendant is therefore constitutionally suspect. The
reasoning of Cooperseems fully applicable here.
Neither contemporary nor historical practices offer sufficient
precedent for requiring a defendant to demonstrate his mental
retardation at an elevated level of proof. Policy considerations
point to the same conclusion. The mentally retarded
individual's interest in being punished at a level less than
death obviously is at the highest level. The State's interest in
the fair implementation of its capital punishment law is
considerable, but does not require the allocation of such a
heavy evidentiary burden on the defendant.59 As the Court
noted in Cooper, "A heightened standard does not decrease
the risk of error, but simply reallocates that risk between the
parties." 60 After Atkins and Cooper, it is clearly
unconstitutional to assign to the defense the burden of
persuasion at an elevated (i.e., "clear and convincing evidence"
or "beyond a reasonable doubt) level.
Recommendation:
States whose laws currently impose a heightened burden
on the defendant should amend their statutes to avoid
unnecessary litigation over this constitutional infirmity.
Whether the burden of persuasion can be assigned to the
defense at all, even at a "preponderance" level, is a
considerably thornier issue. As noted earlier, all the States
that acted before Atkins placed the burden with the defendant.
But because of decisions in the Supreme Court's most recent
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term, there is some doubt as to whether that allocation is
constitutional.
The doubt arises at the intersection of Atkins and the
Court's most recent decision regarding the right to ajury trial.
In Ring v.Arizona,61 the Court held that States are required to
afford capital defendants the right to have all factual questions
that are necessary preconditions to the death penalty resolved
by a jury. Arizona law had provided that judges made the
determination regarding the aggravating factors that could
lead to a death sentence. "Because Arizona's enumerated
aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an
element of a greater offense, the Sixth Amendment requires
that they be found by a jury. ' 62 And where something has
been deemed to be an element or its equivalent, the prosecution
must carry the burden of persuasion "beyond a reasonable
doubt.

63

It is not absolutely clear whether the post-Atkins question
of whether a defendant has mental retardation is the "functional
equivalent" of an element of the crime, 61 but it certainly bears
most of the attributes described in Ring.65 If the issue proves
to be a Ring-equivalent, then both the Sixth Amendment's
right to a jury determination of the issue and the State's
obligation to carry the burden of persuasion "beyond a
reasonable doubt" must apply. States that choose to ignore
this very real possibility do so at the peril of having their
new statute declaredunconstitutional,and risk the necessity
of retrying capitaldefendants convicted and sentenced under
66

that statute.

States are thus confronted with the dilemma of wishing to
resolve the question at a pretrial bench proceeding, for both
economic and constitutional reasons, 67 and the need to afford
defendants the Sixth Amendment rights described in Ring.
Happily, it is possible to protect both interests, and by doing
so, insulate the constitutionality of the statute from challenge.
Two alternative approaches are offered. Each attempts to
satisfy the requirements of Ring and still preserve the fairest
possible evaluation of the defendant's mental disability. The
first (Alternative A) begins with a pretrial bench hearing on
death eligibility, with a subsequent opportunity for the defense
to present the issue to a trial jury. The second (Alternative B)
addresses the mental retardation issue in a special pretrial
hearing before a separate jury from the one that will ultimately
hear the trial.
UnderAlternative A, the resolution of this dilemma involves
a hybrid procedure, in which the principal determination is
made before the judge in a pretrial proceeding, but with the
defendant retaining the right, if the pretrial decision on the
mental retardation issue is adverse, to present the issue to the
trial jury.61 This follow the model approved by the Supreme
Court in a case involving the admissibility of confessions in
Jackson v. Denno.69 It also approximates the structure adopted
in the recent mental retardation legislation adopted by the
70
North Carolina Legislature.
Under this approach, the question of whether a defendant
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has mental retardation will be addressed, in the first instance,
in a pretrial bench proceeding at which the defendant bears
the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence.7
It is anticipated that most cases will be resolved at this stage.
But if the case proceeds to a capital trial, and the defendant is
convicted, the defense retains the opportunity to present the
issue to the jury in the form of a special verdict prior to the
commencement of the penalty phase. This jury consideration
would be governed by the constitutional requirements of Ring
v. Arizona.
This bifurcated approach may at first appear awkward to
some legislators, and some prosecutors may initially be
concerned that it offers the defendant "two bites at the apple."
But, as in Jackson, the bifurcation makes sense because its
two prongs address two separate (although factually related)
questions. The first, to be addressed by the judge, is the
legal issue of whether the defendant is a person who is eligible
for the death penalty. If the court does not find the defendant
death-eligible because of mental retardation, it would be
unconstitutional to proceed with a capital trial. The second
inquiry, by the jury, is whether the prosecution has
demonstrated that the defendant is factually an individual
upon whom the death penalty may be imposed. Condemning
a defendant to death who has properly raised the issue of
mental retardation then becomes "contingent on the finding
of a fact" that is a necessary precondition to a capital
sentence.72
Under Alternative B, the trial is also bifurcated, but the
pretrial determination of a defendant's death eligibility under
Atkins is before ajury, with the prosecution bearing the burden
of persuasion at the level of beyond a reasonable doubt. For
a variety of reasons concerning the integrity ofjury evaluation
of all aspects of the case, it is essential that this pretrial jury be
a separate body from the jury that will ultimately hear the case.
Under this alternative, a defendant who was unsuccessful on
this issue before the pretrial jury would not have an opportunity
to re-litigate the issue of death eligibility, but would be free to
raise mental disability in the trial on any issue to which it
might be relevant, and, if convicted, would be free to offer
such evidence as mitigation.
Of the two models, Alternative A would appear to be the
more economical approach because it involves the costs
attendant to only one jury proceeding. But either alternative
would address defendants' rights under both Atkins and Ring.
Recommendation:
States should adopt one of the following alternative
bifurcated systems for adjudicating a claim that a defendant
may have mental retardation.
Note: The drafting of proceduresfor the adjudication of
mental retardationcases under either alternative will need
to be addressedin the context of particularState's rules for
conducting capital trials. The language suggested here can
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be readily adapted into the capitalproceduresalready in the
State's statutes or rules of criminalprocedure.
Recommended Statutory Language [Alternative Al:
If defense counsel has a good faith belief that the defendant
in a capital case has mental retardation, counsel shall file a
motion with the court, requesting a finding that the defendant
is not death-eligible because of mental retardation. Such a
motion shall be filed within [time period] after the prosecution
files notice of intent to seek the death penalty, unless the
information in support of the motion came to counsel's
attention at a later date.
Upon receipt of such a motion, the trial court shall conduct
a hearing for the presentation of evidence regarding the
defendant's possible mental retardation. Both the defense
and the prosecution shall have the opportunity to present
evidence, including expert testimony. After considering the
evidence, the court shall find the defendant is not death-eligible
if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant
has mental retardation. If the defendant is not death-eligible
because of mental retardation, the trial may proceed as a noncapital trial, and, if convicted, the defendant may be sentenced
to any penalty available under State law, other than death.
If the court finds that defendant is death-eligible, the case
may proceed as a capital trial. The jury shall not be informed
of the prior proceedings or the judge's findings concerning
the defendant's claim of mental retardation.
If the capital trial results in a verdict of guilty to a capital
charge, the parties shall be entitled to present evidence to the
jury on the issue of whether the defendant has mental
retardation. Having heard the evidence and arguments, the
jury shall be asked to render a special verdict on the issue of
mental retardation. The special verdict shall ask the jury to
answer the question: "Do you unanimously find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant does not have mental
retardation?" If the jury answers "yes," the case shall proceed
to a penalty phase under [State statute regarding penalty phase
of capital trials). If the jury answers "no," defendant may be
sentenced to any penalty available under State law, other than
death.
Recommended Statutory Language [Alternative BI:
If defense counsel has a good faith belief that the defendant
in a capital case has mental retardation, counsel shall file a
motion with the court, requesting a finding that the defendant
is not death-eligible because of mental retardation. Such a
motion shall be filed at least [time period] prior to the date for
trial, unless the information in support of the motion came to
counsel's attention at a later date.
Upon receipt of such a motion, the trial court shall conduct
a hearing for the presentation of evidence regarding the
defendant's possible mental retardation. The hearing shall
be conducted before ajury, which shall be specially empanelled
for this issue only. Both the defense and the prosecution shall
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have the opportunity to present evidence, including expert
testimony. After considering the evidence, the jury shall be
asked, by special verdict, "Do you unanimously find, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant does not have mental
retardation?" If the jury finds, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant does not have mental retardation, the case
may be certified for a capital trial. Such a trial shall be
conducted before a separate jury. The trial jury shall not be
informed of the prior proceedings or the findings concerning
the defendant's claim of mental retardation, and the defendant
shall not be precluded from offering evidence of the
defendant's mental disability in the guilt/innocence phase
or the penalty phase of the trial.
If the defendant is not eligible for the death penalty because
of mental retardation, the trial may proceed as a non-capital
trial, and, if convicted, the defendant may be sentenced to any
penalty available under State law, other than death.

VI. Adjudication of Post-Conviction Cases
It is clear that the Eighth Amendment protection for
individuals with mental retardation announced in Atkins
applies both to prospective and retrospective cases. 73 Many
of the considerations already discussed in the earlier sections
concerning prospective cases apply equally to review of postconviction cases. But States should consider enacting
procedural provisions for cases involving individuals already
under death sentences.
The States have the opportunity to create both a fair and
orderly process for consideration of claims of mental
retardation that will mesh with existing State criminal and
capital procedures. Although claims that any such procedures
violate constitutional protections may be raised in State and
Federal courts, the absence of procedures will require
individual judges to design procedures as individual claims
of mental retardation arise, thereby creating the potential for
inconsistent and incompatible procedures in the various
jurisdictions within the State.
Several of the States that legislated on the mental retardation
issue prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins were
either silent on the issue of retrospective relief, or provided
that the statute's protection extended only to defendants in
new cases. In two States, the State Supreme Court held that
individuals under death sentences that pre-dated the
legislative enactment in their States were entitled to equivalent
relief under the punishment provisions of the State
Constitutions.74 Therefore, in a number of the States that
have enacted prospective-only legislation prior to Atkins, there
is reason to enact new legislation that provides procedures
for retrospective cases.
Although few of the early enactments addressed the issue
of retrospective relief, the North Carolina Legislature did so
in 2001. 71 The general outlines of the North Carolina
provisions merit consideration by other States.
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Availability of a State Forum
The centerpiece of the North Carolina approach is provision
of a forum in State courts for the resolution of retrospective
claims by defendants who may be entitled to relief after Atkins.
While States obviously cannot prevent review of claimants in
Federal court to relief under habeas corpus, providing a
remedy at the State level will permit the resolution of most
cases under procedures designed to fit within the context of
State law. This will provide for a more orderly consideration of
both initial claims and appellate review. The ability to manage
the consideration of these cases may be particularly important
in States with a substantial number of inmates currently under
sentence of death.
Time Limitsfor Filing Petitionsfor Relief
States have an obvious interest in an orderly consideration
of claims under this legislation. Requiring inmates currently
under a death sentence to file potential claims in a timely and
predictable manner obviously assists in the administration of
justice.
The determination of the time period within which claims
must be filed is somewhat more complex. One consideration
arguing for a relatively short time period is to allow the State's
criminal justice system to discover the magnitude of the body
of cases to be considered. A reasonable time limit also may be
thought to prevent dilatory tactics by defendants already under
sentence of death.
But, paradoxically, a filing deadline that is too short may
frustrate these very goals. Although some cases may have
produced trial or post-conviction investigations into the
possibility of a defendant's intellectual impairment, other cases
may not have been explored thoroughly by counsel prior to
Atkins. Requiring the filing of petitions on an excessively
short deadline may lead some counsel whose clients' cases
have not been carefully explored to file within the time limit
even though there is incomplete evidence that the defendant
may have had mental retardation. One might speculate that a
State that enacted a very short deadline would actually have
to adjudicate more cases than if it had provided the opportunity
for fuller investigation.
North Carolina's legislation provided that cases should be
filed within 120 days of the enactment of the statute. The
language below recommends the somewhat longer period of
180 days. It is hoped that this slightly longer period will reduce
the flurry of claims experienced at the end of the time period in
2001 in North Carolina. Permitting a fuller investigation of the
cases may assist in their orderly and fair consideration.
Conducting Post-Conviction Hearings
The language below recommends the employment of
generic State court rules for consideration of post-conviction
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cases. This assumes that the State provides such a forum on
other issues, and that it provides for the appointment of counsel
in such cases. In those States where those assumptions are
not correct, it will be necessary to enact fuller procedural
protections for the consideration of Atkins-related claims.
The recommended language below also does not address
the issue of factual findings made by courts prior to the Atkins
decision. The cases that will arise in post-conviction will vary
considerably. In some cases, the issue of potential mental
retardation may not have been litigated at all, either because
counsel was unaware of the client's mental disability or
because of a concern that evidence of mental retardation might
be considered a "two-edged sword ' 76 whose mitigating
significance might be misunderstood by jurors. In other cases,
evidence may have been offered regarding the defendant's
mental retardation, but with no resolution of the issue required
under State law at the time.77 In a third category will be cases
in which some evidence was offered, but counsel lacked the
incentive to pursue the issue fully, since it was not dispositive
under then-applicable State law. In a final category, there may
be cases in which there has been a direct finding by either the
judge or jury that the defendant had mental retardation, or
even a stipulation to that fact by the prosecution. Only in this
final category of cases would a court, reconsidering the case
following Atkins, appropriately grant the petition without
requiring fuller exploration of proffered evidence regarding
the defendant's mental disability.
Burden of Persuasion
Traditionally, the burden of persuasion in post-conviction
cases rests with the applicant by a preponderance of the
evidence. Although some of the considerations discussed in
the earlier section on hearings in new cases raise some
constitutional questions about the appropriateness of ever
placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant on this
issue, the language below makes no recommendation regarding
78
transferring the burden of persuasion to the State.
Recommendation:
States should enact laws to provide for the fair and orderly
consideration of post-conviction claims by defendants who
claim to have mental retardation.
Recommended Statutory Language:
In cases in which the defendant has been convicted of firstdegree murder,sentenced to death, and is in custody pending
execution of the sentence of death, the following procedures
apply:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court,
a defendant may seek appropriate relief from the defendant's
death sentence upon the ground that the defendant was an
individual with mental retardation at the time of the
commission of the capital offense.
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A motion seeking appropriate relief from a death sentence
on the ground thatthe defendant was an individual with mental
retardation shall be filed within:
(a) 180 days of the effective date of this Act; or
(b) 180 days of the imposition of the sentence of death
if the trial was in progress at the time of the
enactment of this Act. For purposes of this section,
a trial is considered to be in progress if the
process ofjury selection has begun.
The petition seeking relief from a sentence of death under
this section shall be in substantial compliance with the [State's
rules for petitions for relief in capital cases]. Upon receipt of
a petition under this section, the court shall invite a response
from the [prosecution] [Attorney General]. Following briefing
from the parties, the court shall conduct a hearing on the
petition in compliance with [the State's rules for postconviction proceedings].
Findings by a trial court under this section that a defendant
either is or is not entitled to relief may be appealed to the
[State's highest court].

VII. Clemency
It is fervently to be hoped that the preceding provisions
will suffice to prevent the execution of any individual with
mental retardation. But experience teaches that sometimes
the machinery of the criminal justice system works imperfectly,
and for any number of reasons, an individual with mental
retardation might end up on Death Row, facing the prospect
of execution. Such an execution would, of course, violate the
Eighth Amendment.
Clemency has long been justified as a last opportunity to
prevent unjust punishment. "Clemency is deeply rooted in
our Anglo-American tradition of law, and is the historic remedy
for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial process
has been exhausted."79 Even before the Supreme Court's
decision in Atkins, in several instances clemency has been
exercised to prevent the execution of individuals with mental
retardation.80
State laws vary widely on the subject of clemency. In many
States, the Governor (or some other body) has plenary
authority to grant clemency."' In other States, the authority to
prevent the execution of a capital sentence may be more
circumscribed.1 2 Particularly in those States where there are
limitations on the exercise of the clemency authority, it is
essential for the Legislature to make clear that providing
clemency for an individual who is discovered to have mental
retardation is not only lawful, but also is to be expected.
Recommendation:
States should enact legislation authorizing clemency for
individuals with mental retardation.
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Recommended Statutory Language:
Notwithstanding any other provision of state law, the
[Governor] [Board of Pardons and Paroles] shall have full
authority to grant clemency and commute a capital sentence
to a noncapital sentence for any inmate whom the [Governor]
[Board of Pardons and Paroles] determines to have mental
retardation.
*James W. Ellis is Regents Professor of Law at the University
of New Mexico. In addition to arguing for Petitioner in Atkins
v. Virginia, he has represented the American Association on
Mental Retardation and other disability organizations as amici
curiaein a number of Supreme Court cases, including Penry v.
Lynaugh and Cooperv. Oklahoma. He is currently a member
of the ABA Commission on Mental and Physical Disability
Law. The Commission, in partnership with the National
Organization on Disability, awarded him the Paul G. Hearne
award for furthering the rights, dignity, and access to justice
for people with disabilities. In addition, the National Law
Journal named him Lawyer of the Year for 2002.
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1. 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
2- 517 U.S. 348 (1996).
3. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
4. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
5. Id. at 335. Four of the Justices in Penry believed there
was an adequate basis for invalidating the practice
because of the reduced culpability of people with mental
retardation. Id. at 341 (Justices Brennan and Marshall);
id. at 349 (Justices Stevens and Blackmun).
6. The Court initially agreed to hear the issue in the case of
McCarverv. North Carolina,548 S.E.2d 522 (N.C. 2001),
cert.granted, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001), cert. dismissed, 122
S. Ct. 22 (2001). When that case was rendered moot, the
Court accepted the Atkins case. See infra note 75.
7. 122 S. Ct. at 2246.
8. Id. at 2247-48 (internal citation omitted).
9.

REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL

(Apr. 2002). In a footnote, the Court also
took note of other indicators of public opinion that
appeared to confirm the consensus found in State
legislation, including positions taken by professional
organizations, religious bodies, international
organizations, and surveys of public opinion. "Although
these factors are by no means dispositive, their
consistency with the legislative evidence lends further
support to our conclusion that there is a consensus among
those who have addressed the issue." 122 S. Ct. at 124950 n.21.
10. 122 S. Ct. at 2251.
11. Id. at2252.
12. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Three members of the
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Court-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas-dissented from the Court's opinion. The Chief
Justice's dissent objected to the majority's methodology
in ascertaining a national consensus, and was particularly
critical of the footnote in the Court's opinion that
discussed professional organizations, public opinion
surveys, and the views of other nations. Id. at 2252-59.
Justice Scalia's dissent was similarly critical of the
majority's methodology, which he found to be inconsistent
with the Court's precedents. Id. at 2259-68.
13. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §532.140(3) (Banks-Baldwin

2001).
14. See, e.g., N.M. STAT.
15. N.C. GEN.

STAT.

ANN.

§31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2002).

ANN. § 15A-2005-006 (West 2002).

16. Federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,21 U.S.C. §848(1)
(2000); see also COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-9-403 (1997).
17. 122 S. Ct. at 2250. See also 122 S. Ct. at 2250 n.22.
18.

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY,

CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 11

(Herbert J. Grossman ed., 8th ed. 1983) (hereafter AAMD,
CLASSIFICATION (1983)).

19. 122 S. Ct. at 2245 n.3.
20. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

ON MENTAL RETARDATION:

DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5

(Ruth Luckasson ed., 9th ed. 1992) (hereafter
AAMR MENTAL RETARDATION (1992)). The American
Psychiatric Association's formulation follows the 1992
AAMR version closely:
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning
(Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations
in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following
skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/
interpersonal skills, use of community resources, selfdirection, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health
and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before
age 18 years (Criterion C). Mental Retardation has many
different etiologies and may be seen as a final common
pathway of various pathological processes that affect the
functioning of the central nervous system.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. Text

Revision, 2000) (hereafter APA, DSM-IV-TR).
21.

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL
RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF

SUPPORTS 1 (Ruth Luckasson ed., 10th ed. 2002)
(hereafter AAMR, MENTAL RETARDATION (2002)). In

addition to providing the current definition of mental
retardation and explaining related concepts and
terminology, the 2002 edition of this manual provides
valuable background on such topics as the history of
classification, clinical assessment of people with mental
retardation, and an extensive bibliography of references
to the clinical literature. AAMR's website is
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www.aamr.org.
22. The relevant professional organizations have long
recognized the importance of clinical judgment in
assessing general intellectual functioning, and the
inappropriateness and imprecision of arbitrarily assigning
a single IQ score as the boundary of mental retardation.
See, e.g., AAMR, MENTAL RETARDATION (2002), supra
note 21, at 57-59 and sources cited therein; AAMR,
MENTAL RETARDATION (1992), supra note 20, at 14
("Mental retardation is characterized by significantly
subaverage intellectual capabilities or 'low intelligence.'
If the IQ score is valid, this will generally result in a score
of approximately 70 to 75 or below. This upper boundary
of IQs for use in classification of mental retardation is
flexible to reflect the statistical variance inherent in all
intelligence tests and the need for clinical judgment by a
qualified psychological examiner."); AAMD,
CLASSIFICATION (1983), supranote 18, at 11 ("This
upper limit is intended as a guideline; it could be extended
upward through IQ 75 or more, depending on the reliability
of the intelligence test used. This particularly applies in
schools and similar settings if behavior is impaired and
clinically determined to be due to deficits in reasoning
and judgment."); APA, DSM-IV-TR, supranote 20, at 4142 ("Thus it is possible to diagnose Mental Retardation
in individuals with IQs between 70 and 75 who exhibit
significant deficits in adaptive behavior."). See generally
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF
DIAGNOSIS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN MENTAL

RETARDATION (John W. Jacobson & James A. Mulick eds.
1996); NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL, MENTAL RETARDATION:
DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 5

(National Academy Press 2002).
23. This fact is reflected in the Atkins decision, where the
Court noted that "an IQ between 70 and 75" is "typically
considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function
prong of the mental retardation definition." 122 S.Ct. at
2245 n.5.
24. In conjunction with the age-of-onset requirement, it also
provides a check against any possibility of malingered
claims of mental retardation. See discussion infra.
25. See, e.g., TENN.CODE ANN.§39-13-203(a)(l)-(3) (1997);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030(2)(a) (West Supp. 2002).
26. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §15A-2005(a)(1) (West 2002);
MO. ANN. STAT. §565.030(6) (West 2002).
27. AAMR, MENTAL RETARDATION (1992), supranote 20,

at 15-16.
28. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
29. One other important consideration about adaptive
behavior merits careful attention, even though it affects
implementation rather than the actual drafting of
legislation. The focus in evaluations (and ultimately
adjudications) under the adaptive prong must remain
focused on the individual's limitations, rather than any
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30.

31.

32.
33.

skills he or she may also possess. AAMR and other
clinical experts emphasize that the presence of skills
cannot preclude the appropriate diagnosis of mental
retardation. In the most recent edition, the definition of
mental retardation is prominently accompanied by the
admonition that "Within an individual, limitations often
coexist with strengths." AAMR, MENTAL RETARDATION
(2002), supra note 21, at 1 (emphasis supplied). Accord
AAMR, MENTAL RETARDATION (1992), supra note 20, at 1
("Specific adaptive limitations often coexist with strengths
in other adaptive skills or other personal capabilities.").
The skills possessed by individuals with mental
retardation vary considerably, and the fact that an
individual possesses one or more that might be thought
by some laypersons as inconsistent with the diagnosis
(such as holding a menial job, or using public
transportation) cannot be taken as disqualifying.
The sole purpose of the adaptive prong of the definition
for the criminal justice system is to ascertain that the
measured intellectual impairment has had real-life
consequences. Thus, the presence of confirming deficits
must be the diagnostician's focus.
This is not to suggest that States that have already
legislated on this topic are required to alter their statutory
definition. But where a State is considering new
legislation, or is considering amendments on other
components such as procedures, legislators might wish
to consider adopting the 2002 AAMR definition. Another
reason to consider the 2002 version is that it will be the
definition with which clinical evaluators, in future cases,
will be most familiar. This increasing familiarity and
consistency with evaluations performed in other contexts
should facilitate evaluations in capital cases as well.
It is not required that an individual have been tested with
scores indicating mental retardation during the
developmental period. Rather, there must have been
manifestationsof mental disability, which will more
frequently have taken the form of problems in the area of
adaptive behavior at an early age. See APA, DSM-IV-TR,
supra note 20, at 42 ("Impairments in adaptive functioning,
rather than a low IQ, are usually the presenting symptoms
in individuals with Mental Retardation.").
See, e.g., APA, DSM-IV-TR, supranote 20, at 163 (Dementia
Due to HIV Disease).
In fact, if there were a capital prosecution of an individual
who met the definition of mental retardation except for
the age of onset, principles of equality likely would require
comparable exemption from capital punishment. State
Legislatures concerned about the possibility of such cases
could easily omit the age of onset requirement from their
definition of mental retardation. But even where the
statute contains an age-of-onset provision, other bodies
would be well advised to consider arguments regarding
comparative culpability. In some States, this could be
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34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

39.

addressed appropriately by the trial judge in ruling on an
individual's eligibility for the death penalty. In other States,
it might be addressed on appeal to the State's appellate
court, either in performing statutorily mandated review
under proportionality provisions, see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§2C: I1-3e (West 1995), or in interpreting the State
Constitution's provisions regarding equal protection or
excessive punishments. See generally Van Tran v. State,
66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001) (State Constitution's
punishment provision prohibited execution of a defendant
with mental disability comparable to that of defendants
protected by prospective-only mental retardation statute).
If none of these bodies has ordered relief from a death
sentence, it would be an appropriate function of the
Governor or other relevant clemency-granting authority
to commute the sentence of such an individual to a
punishment other than death.
See, e.g., RICHARD ROGERS & DANIEL W. SHUMAN,
CONDUCTING INSANITY EVALUATIONS 90-120 (2d ed. 2000).
470 U.S. 68 (1985).
Id. at 77.
Id.at 83.
See, e.g., James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally
Retarded CriminalDefendants, 53 GEORGE WASH. L.
REv. 414, 487 (1985) ("[M]ental retardation differs
sufficiently from other forms of mental disability that
training in mental illness cannot, without more, qualify a
physician to provide useful information about a mentally
retarded person. Similarly, typical medical school training
and the attainment of the academic degree of M.D. cannot,
without more, qualify a physician to give expert testimony
about mental retardation.").
AAMR, MENTAL RETARDATION (2002), supranote 21,
at 51-71; AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION,
MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN

113-26 (John W. Jacobson & James
A. Mulick eds., 1996); John J. McGee & Frank
Menolascino, The Evaluationof Defendants with Mental
Retardation in the CriminalJustice System in THE
MENTAL RETARDATION

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MENTAL RETARDATION:

DEFENDANTs AND VI CTIS 55,65-68 (Ronald W. Conley, Ruth

Luckasson & George N. Bouthilet eds. 1992).
40. See generallyAAMR, MENTAL RETARDATION (2002),
supranote 21, at 73-91.
41. "Courts should not operate under the illusion that the
simple administration of any test will resolve all questions
regarding a retarded person's status in a criminal case.
Systematic assessment requires the thoughtful selection
and administration of valid examination instruments
together with careful observation, interviewing, and
analysis of all the data by a professional with proper
training and experience." Ellis & Luckasson, supra note
38, at 487-88.
42. See generally AAMR, MENTAL RETARDATION (2002),
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43.

44.

45.
46.
47.
48.

49.

50.

supranote 21, at 93-96.
But while the provision of expert assistance to the defense
will be essential to any successful implementation of
Atkins, any fears that the States will face years of
protracted "battles of the experts" of the sort associated
with the insanity defense are likely to be unfounded. The
experience in most States that have had statutory
protections for people with mental retardation is that after
a year or two, prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges
become familiar with mental retardation and professionally
competent mental retardation evaluations. And once that
familiarization takes place, the number of contested cases
is substantially lower than had been anticipated. It is the
experience in several of these States that following
exploration of defendants' mental impairments, many cases
are resolved by pleas.
Courts need to be particularly skeptical of evaluators who
purport to be able to perform a clinical diagnosis regarding
mental retardation based on isolated factors and abilities.
Similarly, the defendant's own account of his skills and
abilities is particularly suspect. See Caroline Everington
& Denis W. Keyes, Mental Retardation,8 THE FoRENSIc
ExAMINER 31,34 (1999) ("Although interviewing the person
with mental retardation can provide some information on
present and past abilities, such information should always
be corroborated with external sources as reliability is
questionable.... Frequently people with mental retardation
do not have accurate estimations of their abilities and
often provide distorted versions of past
accomplishments.").
470 U.S. at 80 (quoting Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9,
12(1950)).
See Hellerv. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 322 (1993).
See generallyDaubertv. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S.
579(1993).
In addition, it is the experience of States that have had
mental retardation statutes for several years that when
the issue of mental retardation has been resolved prior to
trial, a considerable number of cases can be resolved by
pleas.
Among the many reasons for the significantly higher cost
of capital trials are the requirement in many States for
more than one defense lawyer in death penalty cases,
higher attorneys' fees for indigent defendants, delays that
may result from the requirement in many States that the
trial judge appoint counsel with death penalty experience,
and the pretrial preparations by both prosecution and
defense for the penalty phase of a bifurcated trial.
This last concern is particularly important because of the
fact that many individuals who have mental retardation
persist in hiding their disability even from their defense
counsel. By merely being uncommunicative, clients may
be able to hide their disability. See Ellis & Luckasson,
supra note 38, at 430-31. Thus, mental retardation may
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not be apparent in the early stages of the preparation of
the defense, and may only emerge as the individual's
background is investigated.
51. The efficiencies of a pretrial bench hearing are even clearer
when the alternatives for the pretrial determination by a
jury are considered. Serious constitutional concerns
would arise if the same jury that will hear the actual trial
was involved in resolving this pretrial question, and the
assembling of a separate jury would involve substantial
costs.
52. See, e.g.,

TENN.CODE

ANN.§39-13-203(e) (1997).

53. Among the factors that make it appropriate to assign a
burden of producing evidence to the defense are:
"whether the pertinent facts were peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant, whether certain evidence
was more readily accessible to one side than to the other,
[and] whether in respect of an issue the proof of a negative
was required." BARARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER,
1 WHARToN's CuPIMINAL EVIDENCE 22-23 (15th ed. 1997).
54. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-20A-2.1 (Michie 2002).
55. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§16-9-403 (West 1997).
56. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (1997). Georgia's statute,

57.
58.
59.

60.
61.
62.

which was the first to be enacted by any State, grafts the
protection for people with mental retardation onto its
existing statute providing a verdict form of "guilty but
mentally ill." See generally Bradley D. McGraw, Daina
Farthing-Capowich & Ingo Keilitz, The "Guilty But
Mentally Ill" Plea and Verdict: CurrentState of the
Knowledge, 30 VILL. L. REV. 117 (1985). It is noteworthy
that when the Georgia Supreme Court found that the
execution of any person with mental retardation violated
the Georgia Constitution, it assigned the burden to
defendants in post-conviction cases at the level of
preponderance of the evidence. Fleming v. Zant, 386
S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1989).
See Pattersonv. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
517U.S. 348(1996).
The Court in Cooperrejected Oklahoma's argument that it
needed to assign the elevated burden to the defendant
out of concern for potential malingering of mental illness
to avoid being tried. As noted in the earlier section on the
definition of mental retardation, any concerns about
malingering are substantially lower than is the case
regarding mental illness. See supranote 34. And of course,
if a defendant were somehow able to successfully feign
mental retardation (a success that has no precedents in
the clinical literature), he would not avoid punishment
altogether, as in Cooper, since the State would still have
the ability to punish him non-capitally at the highest level
provided by State law.
517 U.S. at 366.
122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002). Ring was decided four days after
the Atkins decision.
Id.at 2443 (internal quotation omitted).
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63. Id.at2439.
64. See generallyHarrisv. UnitedStates, 122 S.Ct. 2406,
2410 (2002) ("Yet not all facts affecting the defendant's
punishment are elements."). (The Harriscase, which did
not involve capital punishment, was decided on the same
day as the Ring decision.).
65. "The relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect."
Id.at 2440 (internal quotation omitted). "If a State makes
an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment
contingent on the finding of fact, that fact--no matter
how the State labels it--must be found by a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt." Id.at 2439. The Court even appears
to anticipate a legislative change that was occasioned by
a Supreme Court decision. "If a legislature responded to
one of these decisions by adding the element we held
constitutionally required, surely the Sixth Amendment
guarantee would apply to that element." Id. at 2442.
66. One court has already declared one of the pre-Atkins
statutes unconstitutional as a violation of the Sixth
Amendment under Ring. See State v. Flores,No. CR 9900028 (N.M. Dist. Ct., 5th Jud. Dist., Sept. 20,2002).
67. See supranotes 48, 49, 51.
68. It is essential that the judge's adverse ruling on the motion
is not communicated to jurors, out of concern that it could
unduly influence their decision regarding a special verdict
under Ring or their consideration of the defendant's
mental disability (even if it does not amount to mental
retardation) at the penalty phase. See supra note 52.
69. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). See also Cranev. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
683 (1986). Although there is no direct parallel between
the subject matter of the Jackson confession issue and
the Atkins question, the bifurcated process lends itself to
the resolution of the mental retardation issue.
70. The primary differences between the model suggested
here and the North Carolina legislation relate to the weight
of the burden of persuasion. The Legislature in North
Carolina did not have the benefit of the subsequent
decision in Ring.
71. There remain some constitutional doubts about whether
placing the burden of persuasion on the defense is
permissible, even when the State will bear the burden at
the subsequent jury determination. (In the Jackson v.
Denno analogy, the burden is on the prosecution at the
pretrial stage. See also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477
(1972)). States may wish to consider placing the burden
on the prosecution in the pretrial determination as well,
both to protect against constitutional challenge and to
further facilitate the efficiency of sorting out non-capital
cases before the expense of a capital trial is incurred. Some
States may also choose to have this prosecution burden
at an elevated level, such as clear and convincing
evidence, to more closely approximate the burden the
prosecution will face in the jury trial that will follow.
72. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2439 (emphasis supplied).
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73. Although the Atkins decision itself does not address the
question of retrospective relief, it is a subject on which
the Court had already spoken. In Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989), the Court noted that although another
decision, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), had placed
obstacles to the consideration of "new rules" of
constitutional law in habeas corpus actions, "the rule
Penry seeks is not a 'new rule' under Teague." 492 U.S. at
315.
74. Flemingv. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1989); Van Tran v.
State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001).
75. N.C. GE. STAT. ANN. §15A-2005-006 (West 2002). It was
the enactment of this statute, and in particular its
provisions regarding retrospective relief, that raised the
issue of potential mootness in the then-pending Supreme
Court case of McCarver v. North Carolina,548 S.E.2d
522 (N.C. 2001), cert.granted, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001), cert.
dismissed, 122 S. Ct. 22 (2001). The Attorney General of
North Carolina then requested that the Court dismiss the
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. After dismissing
the writ in McCarver, the Court then granted a writ on the
same issue in the Atkins case.
76. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2252; Penry,492 U.S. at 323-25.
77. This would be true, for example, where evidence of mental
retardation was offered in mitigation at the penalty phase
of a trial, but where jurors were not required to specify
whether they found an individual mitigation claim to have
been proven.
78. Obviously, if a State were to place the burden on postconviction petitioners at a level heavier than a
preponderance of the evidence, much graver
constitutional issues would come into play. Assigning a
burden on petitioner at the "clear and convincing" level
or higher is not acceptable.
79. Herrerav. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,411-12 (1993); see also
Ohio Adult ParoleAuthority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272,
278 (1998) ("a significant, traditionally available remedy
for preventing miscarriages ofjustice when judicial
process was exhausted.").
80. Although it is difficult to research gubernatorial actions
fully, it is clear that there is substantial precedent for
granting clemency on the basis of a defendant's mental
retardation. On January 10, 1991, Governor Richard
Celeste of Ohio commuted the death sentence of Debra
Brown, Elizabeth Green, Leonard Jenkins, and Donald
Maurer to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility. In
each instance, the defendant's mental impairment was a
key factor in the Governor's decision. (Information about
Governor Celeste's clemency decisions can be obtained
from the Ohio Public Defender Commission, 8 E. Long
Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215.) In 1959, Governor Michael
DiSalle of Ohio prevented the execution of Lewis Niday
on the grounds of the defendant's mental retardation. See
K. MooRE, PARDONS 140 (1989) (citing M. DISALLE, & G.
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(1965)). And
although the record is less clear, it appears that mental
retardation combined with traumatic mental illness
constituted the grounds for California Governor Pat
Brown's commutation of the death sentence of Vernon
Atchley in 1961. See E. BROWN & D. ADLER, PUBLIC
JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY: A GOVERNOR'S EDUCATION ON
DEATH Row 80 (1989). Similarly, it appears that mental
retardation was a principal reason for Governor Nelson
Rockefeller's action in the case of Salvatore Agron in the
early 1960s. See Ringold, The Dynamics of Executive
Clemency, 52 A.B.A. J. 240,242 (1966). In 1969, California
Governor Ronald Reagan granted clemency to Calvin
Thomas on the basis of his "record of epilepsy and brain
damage." B. BOYARSKY, RONALD REAGAN: His LIFE AND
RISE TO THE PRESIDENCY 189 (1981). More recently, Missouri
Governor Mel Carnahan commuted the death sentence of
Bobby Shaw, based on Mr. Shaw's mental retardation.
Statement from the Governor on Bobby Lewis Shaw &
Charles Mathenia, June 2, 1993. At the same time, Governor
Camahan granted a 60-day stay of execution to Charles
Mathenia to investigate whether he was an individual
with mental retardation, and ultimately Mr. Mathenia was
found incompetent to be executed because of his mental
BLOCHMAN, THE POWER OF LIFE AND DEATH

retardation. Two of the best known cases of clemency
involved inmates with mental retardation who were on
death row-Anthony Porter in Illinois and Earl
Washington in Virginia-although each was granted
clemency when it was demonstrated that he was factually
innocent of the crime for which he had been convicted.
See Eric Zom, Questions Persist as Troubled Inmate
FacesExecution, CHI. TRB., Sept. 21, 1998, at 1; Francis
X. Clines, Virginia Man is Pardonedin Murder; DNA Is
Cited,N.Y. Tms, Oct. 3, 2000, at A20. It is impossible to
determine how many other clemency decisions have been
based on mental retardation.
See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §552.070 (West 2002).
For an analysis of the various States' approaches to
clemency, see NATIONAL GOVERNORS' AssN. CENTER FOR
POLICY RESEARCH, GUIDE TO EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY AMONG
THE AMERICAN STATES (1988); Clifford Dome & Kenneth

Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of Retributive Justice:
Interpretationsfrom a National Survey of Executive
Clemency Procedures,25 NEW ENG. J. CRM. & CIVIL
CONFINEMENT 413 (1999). See generallyElizabeth
Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation
ofExecutive Clemency, 74 Cm.-KET L. REV. 1501 (2000).
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